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Corporate brand value
Due to the intense proliferation of established and emerging brand 
offerings, the global markets are becoming highly crowded and tur-
bulently dynamic with time-based competition (Gehani, 1995). Yet, 
some brands, such as Apple and Coca-Cola are able to stand out and 
are often preferred by customers over others.  Brand value as a corpo-
rate asset is one of the primary measures of competitive advantage of 
an enterprise that is useful to gain customers’ brand preference over 
rivals (Aaker, 2012). Enterprises also increase their brand relevance 
and gain brand leadership in their product categories to enact en-
try barriers for their rivals and new entrants (Porter & Happelmann, 
2014).  
For example, Google, Microsoft, Intel, and Samsung dominate their 
respective categories.  With their innovations they have altered the 
way we live our lives in the 21st century. These corporate brands, the-
refore, lead the world’s most valuable global brands.  On the other 
hand, the 100-year old iconic Coca-Cola brand led the world’s most 
valuable brands for more than a decade until 2012 (Interbrand, 2015). 
Thus, how does a corporate brand become a global leader in brand 
value?
Corporate brand and identity
In the past, a corporate brand was primarily managed by building 
a distinctive image.  This gradually turned into a corporate identity 
(Aaker, 1991; 2004).  This image was strengthened by clarifying brand 
relevance, which defined its product scope and the brand boundaries 
of its overall business.  Thus, a corporate brand represented the enter-
prise with its unique characteristics and identity, such as credibility.
In 1960, the American Marketing Association defined a brand as a 
trademark, a distinctive name of a product or manufacturer, sign, 
symbol, design or any combinations used to identify the goods and 
services of a seller to differentiate its offerings from those of its com-
petitors.  Corporate brands can block the trespass of a rival with their 
distinctiveness.
The different identities and characters of brands are built on their 
heritage.  Budweiser and Anheuser-Busch brands promote their 
rich heritage with symbols such as the Clydesdales horse-drawn ca-
rriages.  But, at the same time, they want to reach out to the young 
and more intensive users of Budweiser and Bud Light beers.  So 
their brands introduce campaigns against drunk driving, and use 
humorous advertisements about Lizards, Was-Up, and quaking to-
ads.  This helps them balance their old heritage with a contemporary 
touch.  
Relying primarily on the nostalgia of heritage or character may have 
worked for many years in slow moving commodity related industries. 
But intensity of rivalry and rules of market competition tend to chan-
ge much more rapidly in dynamic markets for high-tech industries 
or global geographical domains (Porter & Heppelmann, 2014).  In 
dynamic markets, new brands may rise to the top in 5-10 years, or 
the old established brands may crash and disappear in the same pe-
riod (Gehani, 1995).  Are corporate brands shifting from representing 
their heritage and identity to representing their innovativeness? 
Brands and market dynamics
In fast moving industries or global markets, such as for tablet com-
puters and smart-phones, new entrants can disrupt and dislodge well 
established brands in short periods of time with their innovations. 
Building a global corporate brand usually takes enormous time, re-
sources, and efforts over multiple years (if not decades).  But with 
globalization, social media, and disruptive innovations (Christensen, 
1997; Gehani, 1998) some well established brands, such as Kodak, 
have lost billions of dollars of their corporate brand value in just a 
few years.  
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Eastman Kodak was an iconic corporate brand for over a century sin-
ce 1880s.  It was one of the 30 blue chip companies in Dow Jones 
Index.  Kodak ranked #30 in the world’s most valuable global brands 
until 2002, with a brand value of US$ 9.7 Billion (www.Interbrand.com). 
But within a decade, the memorable ‘Kodak Moment’ became a 
nightmare for hundreds of thousands of stakeholders, including em-
ployees, suppliers, and stockholders when Kodak declared Chapter 
11 bankruptcy in January 2012 (Daneman, 2014).  This brand erosion 
took place because Kodak did not keep up with its innovativeness in di-
gital imaging products, even though millions of customers around the 
world could easily recall the Kodak’s brand with the iconic ‘Yellow Box.’ 
Same is the case with the legendary auto leader General Motors (GM), 
with age-old household brands like Chevrolet, Buick, and their new 
monster gas-guzzler Hummer.  GM declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
and requested government bailout in June 2009 (Isidore, 2009).  
Aakers (2004) proposed that corporate brands, when they are stru-
ggling (such as Sony, Kodak or General Motors), they must go back 
to the roots of their heritages.  Reflect how they had become so suc-
cessful in the first place – against all the odds and hardships they fa-
ced. Hewlett-Packard started in a garage – with nothing but the inte-
llectual capital and dreams of two young founders and $550.  Honda 
tinkered engines during the war-time shortages in the 1940s. and the 
post-war starvation in Japan in the 1950s.  Corporations must not 
forget their founder-innovators’ adventures.  They must reflect and 
re-interpret their past innovations in today’s global and more dyna-
mic contexts (Gehani, 1995).
In this paper we explore how closely corporate brands have become 
related to the innovativeness of their owners. At the surface, brand 
recognition may seem to depend significantly on the eye-catching 
30-second U.S. super-bowl or Olympics sponsorships.  But over the 
years, the corporate brand value of an enterprise reflects the inno-
vativeness of the owner and the functionality of its products.  After 
all, the brand is a signal for the source of different goods and servi-
ces.  And, therefore, customer-delighting goods and services, which 
go beyond marginal customer satisfaction, are rewarded with brand 
loyalty (Gehani, 1998).  Enterprises, therefore, must offer innovative 
and exciting goods and services that match the value of their brands 
(Gehani, 2013). 
Global corporate brands, therefore, must impart their aspirational 
values by making statements not only about their quality, reliability, 
and prices, but also communicate images of the new desirables.  Such 
as their innovativeness and sustainability (as Coca Cola and Apple 
often do).
Research Method
The focus of this study is to explore the role of dynamic innovative ca-
pabilities of enterprises in determining their corporate brand values. 
Based on such examination, we will recommend some common best 
practices about dynamic capabilities that leading global enterprises 
develop and employ.
This research study uses a hybrid research design combining a groun-
ded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) with longitudinal 
evolutionary and cross-sectional analyses based on case studies and 
closely examined empirical evidence (Yin, 1994).  The grounded 
theory approach and case studies are better suited to help explore in-
novative new propositions, and to elaborate “how” and “why” certain 
postulated relationships operate.  On the other hand, the traditional 
comparative statistical research methods are effective to test “if ” cer-
tain hypothesized propositions are supported by selected qualitative 
or quantitative data.  
We will also use the guidance provided by Perrow (1967) recommen-
ding that researchers should try to control for the significant modera-
ting effect of organizational technology in different industries.  There-
fore, our discussions and interpretations are limited to intra-case and 
inter-case analyses of intra-industry innovation capabilities and or-
ganizational performances measured by their corporate brand values 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).  No inferences will be conjectured 
or claimed regarding any inter-industry cross-sectional comparisons.
Our level of inquiry is the firm or organization level. This permits 
using some of the publicly reported and audited financial informa-
tion.  Such secondary information will facilitate the use of grounded 
theory approach to develop new insights into our postulated relation-
ship between corporate brand value and dynamic innovative capabi-
lities of enterprises. 
Literature review: from identity to innovation based 
branding
Brand identity and stakeholder interactions
Traditionally, a corporate brand value was considered to be driven 
from the interactions an enterprise has with its diverse stakehol-
ders (Abratt & Kleyn, 2012).  For example, many potential emplo-
yees prefer employment with Apple over Microsoft. Millions of 
customers contribute to Toyota’s brand equity by buying hybrid 
Prius over Ford Taurus.  Many investors are willing to pay much 
higher stock price-to-earnings ratio for Google than for its pre-
decessor and rival Yahoo (Abratt & Kleyn, 2012; Melewar et al., 
2012).
Therefore, Balmer (2012) and others have noted that strategic 
branding must be constantly communicated with stakeholders in-
side an organization, and outside in its market environment.  Such 
corporate brand development plays a significant role in business 
to consumer interactions as well as in business to business tran-
sactions.
Brand value and erosion
As a result of such efforts, over some years, a corporate brand value 
can account for a significantly large share of the overall market capita-
lization value of a global enterprise (see Table-1).  Whereas this share 
of brand value becomes very noteworthy at the time of a merger or 
an acquisition, the brand value also plays a key role in the day to day 
survival and competitive growth of a global enterprise.
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Table-1: Corporate Brand Values of Global Leaders (2000-2015)
YEAR COCA-COLA APPLE SAMSUNG TOYOTA
$ Billion  $ Billion  $ Billion  $ Billion
2015 78.4  170.3 45.3 49.1 
2014 81.6  118.9 45.5 42.4 
2012 77.8  76.6 32.9 30.3 
2010 70.5  21.1 19.5 26.2 
2008 66.7  13.7 17.7 34.1 
2006 67.0  9.1 16.2 27.9 
2004 67.4 6.9 12.6 22.7 
2002 69.6 5.3  8.3 19.5
2000 72.5 6.6 5.2 18.8
Source: Adapted from various reports of BusinessWeek and Interbrand
Considering the strategic significance of corporate brand value, and 
its impact on an enterprise and its masses of stakeholders, it can be no 
more just managed functionally at the marketing department level. 
In fact, a growing distinction is being made between managing a pro-
duct brand in the marketing department, and governing a corporate 
brand by the firm’s strategic leadership.  The focus in this paper is on 
the latter. (Balmer, 2012; Melewar, Gotsi & Andriopoulos, 2012).
Shifting tectonic terrain of innovation
The landscape for innovation has been shifting dramatically since the 
dawn of the 21st Century, and the ubiquitous growth and proliferation 
of first the Internet and then the social media such as Facebook, Twit-
ter, and many more (Gehani, 1995).  Innovative and inter-connected 
products are transforming competition as well as the value-chains 
of corporations (Porter & Heppelmann 2014). This shifts product 
development from mostly mechanical engineering to systems deve-
lopment.  In the past, the corporations with deep pockets and high 
investments in inventions and research & development (R&D) were 
considered more innovative.  Think General Electric (with Thomas 
Edison’s legacy), AT&T (including Bell Labs), and DuPont (with 
Pioneering R&D Lab).  But, the tsunami of computer-enabled digi-
tal technologies, starting in garages and college dormitories, altered 
all that.  The Millennial “Me-centric” customers quickly switched 
from iconic long-established brands to newly emerging user-centric 
brands.  Move over Levi’s and Limited, welcome Abercrombie & Fitch 
and Zara.  Design and user experiences have become the new impe-
ratives for market success.  Apple’s late-founder CEO Steve Jobs was a 
major catalyst in this transformational movement from R&D driven 
innovation to design-driven innovation (Isaacson, 2011).       
  
Where does the value of a corporate brand come from?  How are the-
se brand values determined?  
Defining terms and boundaries
As mentioned before, the conventional practice of brand management 
was focused on shareholder analysis and identity building (Aaker, 
1991; Kapferer, 1997; Keller, 1998).  But over the past few decades, 
many researchers from different disciplines have been using certain 
common terms quite inconsistently.  For example, there still seems no 
consensus on a shared definition of the terms brand value or brand 
equity, except that it adds value to the overall enterprise.
In accounting literature, brand equity is the value of a brand as a se-
parable asset, as included on a balance sheet, or when sold (Kapferer, 
1997).  On the other hand, the market researchers consider brand as 
the strength of consumers’ attachment to a brand, and its associated 
beliefs (Keller, 1998).  When marketers use brand equity, they refer to 
brand strength.  Some researchers, therefore, have started differentia-
ting these different meanings by using a new term: ‘consumer brand 
equity’ (Wood, 2000).
Ambler and Styles (1996) consider brand equity as a dormant profit 
to be realized in future.  Such expectations based definition is also 
supported by Srivastava and Shocker (1991), who consider brand 
as ‘all accumulated attitudes and behavior patterns in the extended 
minds of consumers, distribution channels, and influence agents, 
which affect long term cash flows and future profits.’  
In view of the various inevitable challenges for estimating brand va-
luation, in this paper we will use the brand values estimated consis-
tently by the same leading brand management agency: Interbrand in 
collaboration with BusinessWeek.  The Interbrand valuation is based 
on three key components: financial analysis of profit performance, 
brand’s role in purchase decisions (relative to price, features, conve-
nience etc.), and brand’s competitive strength for creating future lo-
yalty.  Interbrand uses expert’s panels as well as extensive data from 
Thomason Reuters’s company annual reports, Datamonitor consu-
mer goods data and Twitter’s social media signal.  We will, however, 
limit our discussions and comparisons within an industry, and will 
not imply any deeper significance to the value of a corporate brand.
In the next section, as stated before, we will use grounded theory ap-
proach to analyze the longitudinal development of four iconic global 
brands in the top-10 highest brand values in the world.  They are the 
leaders in their global industries.  We have chosen the period from 
the dawn of the New Millennium in 2000 to 2015.   
Case study 1: Corporate brand value of Coca-cola
Coca Cola has sustained its brand leadership for more than a century 
with its Spencerian scripted logo and distinctive waist-band bottle 
shape (Acevedo, 2008: 2).  Until 2012, for more than a decade, Coca 
Cola was the world’s most valuable Best Global Brand that steadily 
rose from $72.5 Billion in 2000 to $77.8 Billion in 2012 (See Table-1). 
During this period, the corporate brand value of Coke consistently 
scored higher than brand values of technology giants such as IBM, 
Microsoft, Google, and even Apple.  
Long before the arrival of social media, Coca-Cola built a lasting 
brand based on nurturing the social moments of sharing their drinks 
with family and friends.  Interestingly, Coca-Cola still had 73.2 Mi-
llion Facebook fan pages, far ahead of 15.1 Million for Google and 
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9.8 Million for Apple (Elliott, 2013). In 2015, Coca-Cola ranked third 
most valuable Global Brand in the world, with an estimated corpora-
te brand value of $78.4 Billion (Interbrand, 2015).  Only Apple and 
Google exceeded Coke’s brand value, as they innovated new digital 
ways to stay connected with their customers.  
What efforts and practices have contributed to Coca-Cola’s phenome-
nally high corporate brand value?
Customer connectivity
In 1886, Coca Cola started by promoting a medicinal drink to cure 
headaches.  Some suspect that one of its secret ingredients may have 
been an intoxicant from the cocaine plant family.  The company 
achieved exponential growth for sales of concentrate syrup by giving 
away licensing bottling rights to others for a low price.  
In 1984, with fast creeping market threat from sweeter Pepsi Cola 
brand, Coca-Cola chair Robert Woodruff approved his successor 
CEO Roberto Goizuetta to launch the “New Coke” brand – based on 
their extensive ‘blind’ market research. The loyal customers of the ori-
ginal coca-cola were outraged and reacted strongly against the with-
drawal of their favorite drink.  The old drink was quickly brought 
back and re-branded as the Classic Coke.  At Coke, customers always 
come first.
Coca Cola’s brand strength was built on the company’s primary em-
pathy for their customers’ delightful experience.  Their ad campaigns 
such as “The Real Thing,” and “Enjoy” became iconic components of 
American culture.  In 1923, the company promoted “Pause and Re-
fresh Yourself.”  This was changed to “The Pause That Refreshes” in 
1929, when the Great Depression was kicking in.  Then came “Things 
Better with Coke” in 1963, “It’s the Real Thing” in 1969, and on and on, 
until “Open Happiness” in 2009.  Coke’s brands and slogans symbolize 
America all over the world.  
Social Responsibility and Stakeholder Interactions
Coke has often strengthened its corporate brand by promoting the 
company’s corporate social and environmental responsibility mis-
sion. CEO Robert Woodruff supported civil rights, and donated large 
sums of money to Emory University in Atlanta where Coca-Cola has 
global headquarters.  Even after his retirement, the Woodruff Foun-
dation has been a major philanthropic institution supporting arts, 
education, and medical research.  
Coke’s new corporate priorities are “Women, Water, and Well-being” 
for the “Me, We, World.”  ‘Me’ is for enhancing personal well-being. 
‘We’ is for community development.  And the ‘World’ is for protecting 
the environment.  
In late 2010, Coca-Cola launched a 5by20 initiative to empower 5 
million women around the world by 2020 (Overbolt, 2012).  Coca-
Cola noted that whereas almost 50% of its workforce is women, very 
few of the distributors are women.  The company reached out to wo-
men entrepreneurs in Brazil and enabled them to acquire truck li-
censes and digital computing technology to become the company’s 
first-generation distributors.  In poor countries, Coca-Cola provided 
solar-powered coolers to women shopkeepers to help them use solar-
powered lanterns ad keep their shops open for longer hours.
In India, Coca-Cola has a very popular mango-based drink Mazza 
with 80% market share (Christensen, 2013). The demand was growing 
so fast that Coca-Cola was unable to keep up with the growing de-
mand.  The company worked with 30,000 small mango growers so 
that they could grow 2-3 times more mangoes than they could grew 
before.  This was win-win-win as it helped the company get more 
supplies,  the farmer earned more money, and the country boosted its 
gross-domestic-product (GDP)  
The company has also adopted water stewardship in a big way.  Water 
is a critical raw material for Coke’s business. This is also in line with 
the United Nations’ millennial goal of providing basic access to water 
and sanitation to the poor millions of the world.  The company refers 
to it as connected capitalism (Christensen, 2013).
Environmental responsibility
Coca Cola is also focusing attention on re-designing and innovating 
its packaging for sustainability.   In the 1960s, the Coke branded cans 
and bottles littered everywhere.  The company mobilized its value-
adding resources such as R&D, engineering, and manufacturing, all 
collaborating together, to re-design a more sustainable next-genera-
tion delivery packaging.  Designers played a key role in introducing 
new thinking.
First was the use of recycled poly-ethylene-terephthalate (PET).  The 
manufacturing process was altered to incorporate some recycled PET 
(Christensen, 2013). More recently, more dramatic innovations such 
as bio-degradable bottles have been launched to strengthen the cor-
porate brand value.
Case study 2:  Corporate brand value of Apple
Even when Apple had a minor share of the overall personal compu-
ter market, it held a relatively high ranking among the world’s most 
valuable Top 100 corporate global brands.  This was because of its 
widely acknowledged design elegance, technological innovations, and 
delightful user experiences.  Apple developed high brand relevance, 
and a leadership in its product sub-category for design professionals 
(Wright, Millman and Martin, 2007).
In 2001, Microsoft with a brand value of $65.1 Billion, and IBM with 
a brand value of $52.8 Billion were more than 10 times more valuable 
than Apple’s brand value of mere $5.5 Billion.  Google had yet to enter 
the Top 100 Global Brands. In 2008, Apple’s brand was valued at $13.7 
Billion, ranking at #24 (see Table-1). Then it went to #17 in 2010 with 
a brand value of $21.1 Billion, and in 2012 it landed on #2 position 
at $76.6 Billion with an unimaginable 129% annual increase in brand 
value.  With time-based competition, Apple overtook past Microsoft’s 
brand value of $57.9 Billion and even $72.2 Billion brand value of 
IBM and Google’s $69.7 Billion brand value (Gehani, 1995).
In 2015, Apple’s corporate brand sat at the pinnacle of the world’s 
most valuable global brands.  It was valued at $170.3 Billion: $50 Bi-
llion higher than Google’s $120.3 Billion, and over $100 Billion more 
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than Microsoft’s $67.7 Billion and IBM’s $65.1 Billion.  Apple’s brand 
value exceeded the combined brand value of Microsoft’s and IBM’s 
individual brand values.  Legendary Coca-Cola’s iconic brand value 
slipped to #3rd rank with $78.4 Billion in estimated brand value.  
By closely collaborating with his chief designer Joni Ives, Steve Jobs 
turned the product innovation process at Apple on its head.  Prior 
to his return, the engineers and manufacturers at Apple decided the 
functionality and the technical components needed to engineering 
design a product. There was limited consultations with their desig-
ners.  Or the marketers came in with what they claimed ‘their’ custo-
mers must have.  The designers were called in at the very end – prima-
rily to skin the pre-determined components with a decorative veneer. 
Jobs turned the whole product innovation process on its head.  De-
signers, with empathy for their users’ experiences, prototyped and 
decided what a product or service should look and feel like.  Then 
the engineers were told to pack in the functional components, and 
marketers were told to wait for the millions of delighted loyal custo-
mers come knocking on their doors – as they actually did sometimes 
waiting all night in lines under rain or holiday snow.
Reviving design sensibility
In 1985, CEO Steve Jobs was mostly edged out by the board of the 
company he co-founded and raised since April 1976 with Steve Woz-
niak and Mike Markkula (Isaacson, 2011). Under CEO John Sculley 
who was brought in from Pepsi by Jobs to make Apple more retail 
savvy, Apple struggled for a over a decade. 
From 1993 to 1996, Apple switched CEOs three times, from John Scu-
lley to Michael Spindler, and Gil Amelio. In 1995 Microsoft launched 
its very popular Windows 95, and a year later Apple’s sales for Macin-
tosh desk top computers crashed precipitously.  
In 1997, Jobs partnered with his arch-rival Bill Gates at Microsoft and 
received an infusion of $150 million that Apple badly needed (Isaac-
son, 2011).  Microsoft was able to launch Microsoft Office for Macin-
tosh – a blockbuster for both.
Jobs completely re-innovated Apple’s desktop computer between 
1998 and 2001, and launched it with a radical new design as iMac.  It 
came in bright unprecedented colors such as purple, green, and blue. 
This revived the Apple brand significantly.  To promote the corporate 
brand further, in May 2001 Apple announced the opening of Apple’s 
iStores to directly educate and interface with their consumers.  It cost 
money, the sales stayed low in $5 Billion range, and the net income hit 
rock bottom hovering below $100 Million.  With all these shortages, 
Jobs kept funding R&D by more than $400 Million. (See Table-2). 
In October 2001, Apple innovated iPod digital audio player, which 
was seamlessly integrated with iMac, and legally downloadable iTu-
nes - all visible and available to play in iStores.  Jobs, thus took com-
plete control of Apple’s corporate brand, from end-to-end. All these 
rollouts cost money and took time to get the results in earnings.  But 
gradually sales started running upwards.











1996 9,833 8,865 968 604 -  816
1997 7,081 5,713 1,368 485 - 1,045
1998 5,941 4,462 1,479 303 +  309
1999 6,134 4,438 1,696 314 + 601
2000 7,983 5,817 2,166 380 + 786
2001 5,363 4,128 1,235 430 - 25
2002 5,742 4,139 1,603 446 + 65
2003 6,207 4,499 1,708 471 + 69
2004 8,279 6,020 2,259 489 + 276
2005 13,931 9,888 4,043 534 + 1,335
2006 19,315 13,717 5,598 712 + 1,989
2008 32,479 21,334 11,145 1,109 + 4,834
2009 36,537 23,397 13,140 1,133 + 5,704
2010 65,225 39,541 25,684 1,782 +14,013
2011 108,249 64,431 43,818 2,429 +25,922
2012 156,508 87,846 68,662 3,381 +41,733
2013 171,910 106,606 64,304 4,475 +37,037
In 2004, as the financials perked up at Apple, so did its innovativeness 
and corporate brand value.  In 2005, corporate brand value of Apple 
recovered by double digits to $8.0 billion, and it ranked as #41 on the 
Top 100 Most Valuable Global Brands (See Table-1).  
With financial success and growing net income, under Steve Jobs 
Apple become even more innovative. He innovated products with 
dramatic technological capabilities such as iPod Video and iPod 
Touch, which delighted his customers.  And, then in 2007 he radi-
cally disrupted the phone market with the launch of innovative rule-
breaking and elegantly designed mobile iPhone. Between 2007 and 
2013, Apple kept upgrading iPod and iPhone product lines.  Apple’s 
corporate brand value rose with its innovation capabilities.
Case study 3: Corporate brand value of Samsung
Since 2000, Japanese enterprises have been steadily losing their brand 
values of their coveted brands relative to their global rivals not only 
from the US, but also from South Korea.  In global electronics indus-
try, in 2000 Samsung’s brand value of $5.2 Billion was less than 1/3rd 
of Sony’s brand value $16.4 Billion.  
In just 15 years in 2015, Samsung’s $45.3 billion brand value had increa-
sed to approx. 7 times Sony’s highly eroded $7.7 Billion brand value, 
and more than 7 times Panasonic’s $6.4 Billion (See Table-1). In fact, 
Samsung’s brand value was almost twice as much as the total brand 
value of Japan’s top 3 brands Cannon, Sony, and Panasonic combined. 
 
How did Samsung boost its corporate brand value so sky high, ahead 
of other consumer electronics makers?
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Charismatic leadership and design-driven transformation
Until 1995, Samsung Electronics of South Korea manufactured imita-
tive, inexpensive electronic parts and components for other original-
equipment manufacturers (OEMs).  They were made to make things 
according to the specifications and target costs mandated to them. 
The company’s strategic leaders valued efficiency, scale, reliability, and 
speed – with low-cost leadership (Gehani, 2013).
In 1996, Samsung Group Chairman Lee Kun-Hee became quite vi-
sibly frustrated with Samsung’s defective products and lack of in-
novation. He made a big public display of how frustrated he was by 
gathering thousands of defective phones produced by Samsung in the 
lobby of the corporate office.  And then he ran a bulldozer over it 
(Khanna, Song & Lee, 2011).   He often smashed phones against the 
walls to check how rugged they were built.  His recommendation to 
senior Samsung executives: test the phones by throwing them against 
the wall (Gehani, 2013).
Chairman Lee supported the new design training programs with his 
personal attention and a high priority.  Nobody could derail them 
even during the 1997 financial economic downturn.  The newly trai-
ned designers developed a holistic view.  The designers used the same 
tools as the ones they used for innovation: empathy, visualization, and 
experimentation.  They combined these to rapidly develop Samsung’s 
dynamic technological capabilities.
Outside-in & inside-out open talent development
Lee was acutely aware of need for world-class talent. To promote open 
innovation, he instituted a two-pronged global talent development pro-
gram (Khanna et al., 2011).  This involved sending Samsung managers 
with good mental capabilities to go abroad for 18-24 months. They 
learned the local languages, made contacts with some important local 
people, and completed an important value-adding innovation project. 
This was not unlike what Lee’s predecessors had done by going to Japan 
to earn engineering degrees at some of the major Japanese universities 
like Tokyo Institute of Technology and Kyoto University.
The second prong of Lee’s talent development program was Samsung 
recruiters going to the West and hiring the best Korean and non-
Korean MBAs, engineers, and PhDs from leading companies and 
consulting firms in US and Europe (Khanna et al., 2011).  They were 
then appointed in key positions.  To facilitate their smooth entry in 
the Korean organizations, they were given extensive orientation and 
mentoring by senior Korean strategic leaders.
When Samsung Electronics branched out on its own from the con-
glomerate, it was in head-to-head in mortal combat with global elec-
tronics giants like Apple and Sony.  In 2014Q3, Samsung’s profit fell 
60% year-to-year.  In 2015Q1 it recovered a little, but it was still below 
the year before.  In the face of world-wide popularity of iPhone, only 
Samsung survived.  The phone divisions of former rivals such as Mo-
torola, Nokia, Blackberry, and Ericsson are almost gone.  Partly this is 
because since 2006, Samsung has retained its leadership in global TV 
market with its blockbuster brands like One Design, Curved Smart, 
Bordeaux and Touch of Color.  Smartphone sales have also contribu-
ted to record earnings for Samsung (See Table-3).











2009 117,821 81,756 36,065 6,384 8,436
2010 137,905 91,562 46,343 8,115 14,400
2011 142,403 96,785 45,618 8,613 11,853
2012 188,351 118,621 69,730 n.a. 22,333
2013 217,462 130,934 86,528 n.a. 28,978
So: Mergent Database.
Innovating Galaxy Note
Samsung has been constantly looking out for innovative entrepreneu-
rial opportunities.  After introducing Galaxy S smartphone and Galaxy 
Tab tablet, Samsung designers noted a market gap (Yoo & Kim, 2015). 
Many Japanese and Korean workers have been traditionally carrying a 
small pocket diary to take notes during their meetings.  Neither the 4” 
screen phone, nor 9” screen tablet provided a good substitute for this 
pocket diary.  Samsung realize that this would need a new technology 
platform.  Samsung designers quickly developed a design concept for 
a smart diary with 5.5” screen and a pen interface.  When this design 
concept was pitched to Samsung’s senior managers, they questioned 
the new screen size.  The conventional thinking by their marketing de-
partment was that screens for mobile pocket phones can not be larger 
than 5”.  The critics objected that the phone users will not put such a big 
thing next to their face.  It will make their face look smaller.  
The new phone platform required changing users’ attitude towards 
mobile phones.  Samsung designers created a mock-up that looked 
like a diary for test marketing.  It had a smart cover that did not make 
it look that big.  The innovative new ‘phalbet’ category made Galaxy 
Note series very successful and profitable.  Samsung uses its smart 
cover strategy for other products, such as smaller Galaxy S.
Case study 4: Corporate brand value of Toyota
In the global automobile industry, brand values of Toyota (and Hon-
da) continue to dominate far ahead of the global brand values of the 
rest of automakers. Toyota’s brand value of $49.1 Billion in 2015 is 
more than double the brand value of Honda’s brand value of $23.0 
Billion, and more than four times the brand value of Ford with longer 
heritage at $11.6 Billion.  Just over a decade earlier, at the dawn of 
the 21st century in 2000, the $36.4 Billion brand value of Ford was 
almost twice as much as Toyota’s $18.8 Billion brand value.   Toyota 
achieved this by ramping up its production process innovation much 
faster than Ford’s and others.’ 
Open innovation in collaboration with strategic suppliers
Toyota’s brand became one of the world’s most valuable brands with 
its production process innovation, often known as lean production 
system.  One of the key components of Toyota’s innovation strategy 
is its collaborative open innovation with its suppliers (Iyer, Seshadri, 
& Vasher, 2009).  Compared to its American rivals, such as General 
Motors, Ford, and Chrysler, Toyota (as well as Honda) use a close-
knit and integrated collaboration with its suppliers. 
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Womack, Jones and Roos (1990) in their best-selling book The Machi-
ne That Changed the World, shared how Toyota’s production process 
innovation disrupted the global auto industry in general, and the U.S. 
automakers in particular.  Clark and Fujimoto (1991) identified the 
different stage operations and decision-making gates in the innova-
tive lean product development process of Toyota. These observations 
have been validated by many other researchers (Gehani, 1992; Ulrich 
& Eppinger, 2008).  
There is generally a much higher level of mutual trust between Toyota 
and its suppliers (Iyer, Seshadri, & Vasher, 2009).  Many American 
auto corporations tend to swing between adversarial and collabora-
tive open relationships with their suppliers.  On the other hand, at 
Toyota there is much less contract-related paperwork and transac-
tional cost than at Ford or GM.  For example, Toyota has only a 16 
page project requirement document with its major suppliers, whereas 
Toyota’s North American rivals use 3.5 times longer 56 page project 
requirement document (Pereira, Ro and Liker, 2014: 547).
Toyota also uses a single-point of contact (a cross-trained engineer) 
for all communications with a supplier regarding a project’s requi-
rements.  At rival American corporations, the project requirements 
are controlled by multiple persons in the purchasing department with 
different disciplinary backgrounds (Pereira, Ro and Liker, 2014).  To-
yota, invests much more in training and development of the compe-
tence of their engineers, but spends much less time coordinating with 
suppliers than do rival American auto makers.
Enterprise culture
Leaders at Toyota have often claimed that the most important secret 
to the success of their lean process innovation strategy is their culture 
(Takeuchi, Osono & Shimizu, 2008). It codifies certain problem-sol-
ving practices that are etched deep into the hearts and souls of their 
people 
Schein (1984) noted that culture within an organization is like a three-
layered wedding cake.  What we see at the surface are the culture’s arti-
facts.  These artifacts are built on a layer of stated values, and the shared 
beliefs make the bottom layer.  Whereas U.S. automakers have spent 
decades trying to imitate or replicate some aspects of Toyota’s enterpri-
se culture, they have barely scratched some surface artifacts of Toyota’s 
culture (Pereira, Ro and Liker, 2014).  There is still a chasm of differen-
ces in values and beliefs.  Some key differences are as follows:
1. Employee Engagement.  More designers and engineers are 
actively engaged in Toyota than their counterparts in rival U.S. 
auto enterprises.  Through life-long employment, job-rotation, 
and job-enrichment, Toyota continually builds the capabilities 
and competencies of its work-forces deep down into the trench-
es of production and operations. 
2. Visual Communication.  Toyota uses more visual commu-
nication and illustrations than the rival U.S. automakers.  There 
is frequent face-to-face and digital technology mediated com-
munication.  The communication intensity increases when key 
decisions need to be made.  On the other hand, the communication 
intensity at U.S. automakers increases when there is crisis – 
which happens quite frequently.  The Kanban just-in-time pro-
duction system encourages widespread sharing and visual dis-
play of key information (Gehani, 2001).
3. Reduction of Variability Risks:  Toyota reduces its variability 
risk by using clearly articulated specifications and by produc-
tion of products with consistent quality.  The U.S. rivals add to 
their risk when they use unclear specifications and frequently 
change their suppliers on case-by-case or minimum cost-basis.  
4. Fact-based Decision Making.  Most Japanese enterprises, 
including Toyota, use collective decision-making (nemawashi) 
to reduce their risk of making wrong decisions (Gehani, 2001). 
At Toyota most of the design decisions are based on concrete 
objective facts rather than subjective judgments by individu-
al supervisors – particularly managers far removed from the 
gemba work-site.  Whenever there are disagreements, Japanese 
employees at all levels are mandated to go back to the basic 
facts.  In many U.S. enterprises, design decisions are often made 
somewhat arbitrarily by the people higher up in the hierarchy 
because of their more authoritative power.  For example, on one 
hand, an executive may fire a few designers in the guise of cut-
ting cost and improving the bottom line.  But at the same time, 
or soon thereafter, additional supporting administrators may be 
hired at many times more salaries (because they worked with 
the executive during their former employment).  
Discussion
Lessons for corporate brand value from dynamic innovative 
capabilities
What lessons can be learned from the evolutionary grounded theory 
accounts of these multiple case studies.  From the foregoing obser-
vations from four of the most valuable global corporate brands, it is 
quite clear that to sustain their brand values, enterprises must cul-
tivate their unique value-adding resources, and build their dynamic 
innovative capabilities to improve their competitive advantage (Ge-
hani, 1998). We explicate these briefly below to show how the rules of 
competition have changed.  
1. Build dynamic capabilities
The dynamics of competition, value capture, and value creation is 
now changing fast in most industries (Ryall, 2013).  Some resources 
and capabilities are ordinary and commonplace – which every other 
rival corporation can quickly access too.  Enterprises use these resou-
rces to run their hierarchical or entrepreneurial organizations.  Their 
staff must be recruited, paid wages, trained, organized, and motiva-
ted to contribute at their fullest potential.  Government regulations 
must be complied.  The workplace must be safe and free of hazards. 
Suppliers must be selected, certified, and coordinated.  Sales deals 
must be closed.  Banks and other lenders must be paid back on time 
– or else they can shut the enterprise down according to the contract 
terms signed.  These ordinary resources and capabilities are necessary 
to run any enterprise – but these are not sufficient to win the market 
race. They do not help gain sustainable competitive advantage.
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To beat the competition in the market space, on a sustained basis, 
especially in turbulent and complex global markets, such as for elec-
tronic appliances and automobiles, enterprises must develop their 
unique, idiosyncratic value-adding, and hard to imitate resources and 
capabilities.  This is known as the resource-based view of competitive 
strategy (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991).     
And then in fast clock-speed evolving industries and global markets, 
such as the information technology industry or the smartphone in-
dustry, the strategic leaders must accept that the intensity of rivalry 
as well as the market entry rules of the competitive games may alto-
gether change periodically every few years (Ryall, 2013, Christensen, 
1997).  This requires new strategies for innovation.  
2. Need for ongoing open innovations
Even for the well-established corporate brands, such as Coca-Cola, 
Kodak, or General Motors, heritage is not enough.  They must keep 
innovating as Coca-Cola is doing, and Kodak and GM did not.  The 
strategic leaders at Eastman Kodak in the 1990s thought that they 
would be able to continue to leverage their 100-year old iconic brand 
and continue to earn fat profit margins – forever (Gamble and Ge-
hani, 2013).  At first the resolution and quality of ‘disruptive’ digital 
images was inferior, and it did not pose a significant threat to Kodak’s 
high quality photographic films (Gehani, 1993). But Kodak’s digital 
rivals kept getting more innovative, and Kodak stood still.  Kodak’s 
loyal customers left and the new generation of Millennial consumers 
did not see any sizzle in the Kodak brand.  In January 2012 Kodak was 
forced to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (Gamble and Ge-
hani, 2012). After taking care of bankruptcy protection requirements, 
Kodak must innovate hard, like Apple and Samsung, to recover its 
lost market ground.  Only with innovation, Kodak can re-rise like a 
phoenix and recover back its legendary reputation and brand value. 
3. Appreciative culture
As we saw in the case of Toyota’s culture, strategic leaders can not 
overlook the creative and innovative power of their people’s imagi-
nation and trust.  Leading brand owners like Google and Microsoft 
tap that regularly.  The challenge is how to unleash this sub-merged 
intellect and vitality after the top and middle managements have been 
ill-treating their operations staff with mistrust and abuse of rampant 
layoffs.  Every time Kodak’s leadership felt that the Kodak’s stock 
was slipping too low, they laid off a few more thousand employees to 
please the short-term expectations of their Wall Street shareholders 
(Gamble and Gehani, 2012).  This sometimes temporarily increased 
their gross profitability (sales per employee), but very often Kodak 
paid the price with their employees’ falling morale and long-term 
productivity.  Many U.S. companies tend to do this under pressure 
from their aggressive short-term shareholders.  Leaders must rever-
se years of such autocratic abuses.  Only then employees will whole-
heartedly follow their leaders and contribute their imagination and 
innovativeness.  As noted before, the underlying beliefs and ingrained 
attitudes drive the employees’ behavior and the corporation’s culture. 
The personality of an organization’s culture also drives the corpora-
te brand value (Aaker, 2004: 8).  Credible leaders such as Tim Cook 
at Apple, Bill Gates at Microsoft, and Charles Bronson at Virgin At-
lantic, can sway their thousands of followers distributed around the 
world into action.  Such leaders use their own deeds as well as words 
to inspire others.  Other leaders must earn such employee and custo-
mer following.
4. Perceived innovative
Almost all enterprises and their strategic leaders, including owners 
of falling brands such as General Motors, Chrysler, or Sharp, prefer 
to believe that they are innovative – and believe that they are percei-
ved as innovative by their employees and customers.  Whereas some 
employees may be forced to believe this for short periods of time, 
some of the employees and most of the savvy customers can make 
a quick comparison with their rivals’ offerings.  With Internet and 
social media, it has become easy to see through the veneer of pur-
chased promotional haze. Unfortunately, many top management 
leaders, surround themselves with their supporters, and start belie-
ving their own hype. It is not hard for tire users around the world to 
compare tires offered by global brand rivals Goodyear, Bridgestone, 
and Michelin. Same is the case with smart phones, tablet computers, 
and automobiles.  Every brand owner can spend money to buy media 
time, and claim great things. A key factor that many knowledgeable 
customers look for is whether a brand actually delivers on its brand 
promises.  
Perceived quality and perceived innovation, sometimes, may be har-
der to achieve than delivering actual quality and actual innovation 
(Aaker, 2004: 8). Every small cue counts in building up the percep-
tion, trust, and reputation behind a brand.
4. Design thinking and user empathy
Finally, as we noted earlier, empathy with users’ experiences, resonan-
ce with their emotions, and honoring customers’ sensory perceptions 
are the new killer apps that design-driven innovative corporate brand 
leaders, like Apple, Google, and Samsung and others, frequently use. 
To facilitate this, Samsung’s design teams hired artists, writers, and 
ethnographers. Coca-Cola has been doing this successfully for 130 
years. Steve Jobs did this intuitively rather than through market re-
search.  If Toyota did this more, there would be less recalls.
Design thinking also promotes frequent risk-taking and prototyping. 
When Steve Jobs returned to Apple in September 1997, Apple was 
within weeks of filing for bankruptcy. He shut down many incremen-
tal improvements, and focused on a few bold and breakthrough in-
novations such as iPod, iTunes, and iPhone.  This paid off enormous 
returns in profitability and brand value, for many years come.  More 
Japanese brand owners like Sony, Sharp, Toshiba, and Nissan could 
emulate such bold risk-taking.  It is now possible to innovate on the 
run.   
Conclusion
In conclusion, most practicing managers around the world must 
recognize that corporate brand value is one of the most important 
strategic asset that they must manage.  This paper, therefore, set out 
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with a big challenge to re-examine the age-old tradition of building 
corporate brand values based on corporate identity, legacy, and stake-
holder interactions.  We did this by using a more appropriate research 
method of grounded theory approach coupled with case studies, and 
quantitative and qualitative data.  Our evolutionary studies indicated 
that in the 21st Century, the corporate brand values are more closely 
correlated with the firms’ dynamic innovative capability rather than 
their legacy or identity.  We noted this in the case of the fall of the ico-
nic brands of Eastman Kodak and General Motors, and we saw this in 
the phenomenal rise of corporate brand values of Apple and upstart 
Samsung.  Legendary Coca-Cola keeps up its brand value with close 
connectivity with their customers and other shareholders such as wo-
men and environmentalists.  Toyota does this through its reliable pro-
ducts coupled with an enigmatic and paradoxical corporate culture.
Future research studies, could explore these seminal findings for 
larger number of brands, and cull out the moderating influences of 
size of the firm, industry type, age or legacy, product features etc.. 
Another interesting line of inquiry will be to research the effect of 
cross-cultural and national differences. Corporate brand value has 
now become so critical that no managers and researchers can ignore 
it.  Hopefully, this study paved the way for many more researchers to 
follow and more managers to practice.
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